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ABSTRACT 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key element of the global economy. FDI is an engine 
of employment, technological progress, productivity improvements, and ultimately 
economic growth. Because of these significant benefits, attracting FDI has become one of 
the integral parts of economic development strategies in many countries. There are two 
schools of thought that hypothesize the FDI determinants: economic factors and political 
factors. For the latter school of thought, the central questions are: Is there a noticeable 
difference among political parties in a country in their trade policy positions? Do left 
parties advocate different trade policies than right parties? In the advanced industrial 
countries where labour tends to be scarce, are left parties more protectionist than right 
ones, which represent capital owners? Prior evidence had demonstrated an association 
between partisanship and trade policies (FDI policies).  
 This paper extends the cross-country and temporal variance in national regulation 
of FDI. The theory looks at government partisanship, which we define in terms of left 
parties or right parties. The paper tests two hypotheses that explore various aspects how 
the parties in Euro Area and Southeast Asian countries have competed over trade policy. 
This study uses 11 Euro Area countries and 5 Southeast Asian countries that actively do 
outward and inward FDI. The time frame of analysis is 2000-2006 period that is believed 
as a start of Economic Integration in the European Union, which is symbolized with the 
launching of European Single Currency at that time. Statistic methods used for testing the 
hypothesis are t-test and multivariate regression model.   
 The empirical results provide support for an intuitively positive effect of 
globalization that makes left parties and right parties converge on its political economy 
and preference into open or free trade. After controlling for various factors, partisanship 
does not matter. In terms of position taking, both types of partisanship consistently take 
the free trade stances. In other words, it can be believed that Euro Area and Southeast 
Asian governments‘ preference on political economic and FDI are becoming more 
symmetric over time.   
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Introduction 
Since trade policy has significant effects that are predictable and observable, politicians 
are likely to be concerned about trade policy in their efforts to win elections. If so, parties 
should develop positions on trade policy that reflect their constituents‘ interests. As they 
do on other issues, parties should thus adopt positions on policy that reflect their overall 
ideological or partisan position in policy space. Studies of macroeconomic policy (both 
fiscal and monetary) have shown that such party differentiation occurs. Left-wing parties 
prefer policies that increase government spending and induce growth, while right ones 
favor policies that induce lower spending, more balanced budgets, and lower inflation.  
These facts trigger an interesting question to investigate whether there is a 
noticeable difference among political parties in a country on their trade positions, 
especially, which are related to their policies on foreign trade in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Furthermore, this study asks whether this difference relates to some 
left-right ideological distinction among parties. Do left-parties advocate different trade 
policies or FDI policies than right-parties? In other words, can we use parties‘ positions 
on a generic left-right partisanship scale to predict their trade policy preferences?     
Many theories about parties and trade policy respond negatively, predicting 
instead the convergence of parties‘ positions. Parties coded as right-wing on a general 
ideological scale usually announce positions more favorable to free trade and free 
markets generally in their electoral manifestos than do left-parties. In addition to this 
central question, the investigation addresses two related issues. First, does partisanship 
still matter when controlling for the political institutions in which parties are embedded? 
Do domestic political institutions, such as the structure of the party system, the nature of 
electoral rules, or the constitutional systems of government, affect parties‘ position taking 
on trade? If such institutions matter, we should detect important cross-national 
differences in the way parties compete over trade policy. These graphs suggest that 
countries do differ in the nature of their partisan competition over the trade policy. 
Nevertheless, these graphs do not explain why they differ.  
A second subsidiary issue involves longitudinal change. Has there been change 
over time in party competition over trade? Many have speculated that globalization 
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should erode differences in countries‘ and their parties‘ positions on trade. No longer in 
an era of increasing globalization is protectionism possible or desirable. This suggests 
that party differences over trade, if any exist, should be attenuated over time. As 
globalization increases, any left-right divide over trade policy should decline. Are such 
international pressures leading to convergence domestically in the politics of trades?  
In their investigation on 25 developed countries from 1945 - 1998, Milner and 
Judkins (2002) find that right-wing parties announce trade positions that favour free 
trade, meanwhile left-wing parties are more protectionist. Partisanship seems to have an 
important effect on trade policy, holding other factors constant. Pinto and Pinto (2006) 
find evidence of the existence of such partisan cycle of direct investment performance 
across countries and over time at the industrial level. Foreign investors seem to respond 
to partisan cycles: when parties of opposite ideologies alternate in power, FDI flows into 
those sectors where foreign capital is a component of the factor of production owned by 
the core constituent of the incumbent party, and out of those sectors where it substitutes 
for the factor owned by that constituent. 
Earlier research indicates that different forms of FDI react differently to political 
incentives, and hence predicted the existence of partisan cycles in the flow of foreign 
direct investment to different countries. In host country governed by the left, FDI will 
flow to sectors where it is a complemented of labor, such as manufacturing. Moreover, 
some studies argued that capital will be attracted to those sectors where foreign capital is 
a complemented of capital, hence substituting for labor, when the right/pro-business party 
is in power. In other words, in terms of position taking, right parties consistently take 
more free trade positions than do left ones. By holding many other factors constant, 
partisanship matters. 
Most existing research on the motivations for FDI has focused on economic 
factors. Economists have examined the size and various other characteristics of the host 
market, as well as the nature of the MNC (multinational company) or the investment to 
explain individual decisions to invest abroad. Their research suggests that the size of the 
market in the potential host country, levels of economic development, and economic 
growth matter for FDI. 
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While scholars have examined the economic factors affecting FDI at length, they 
have explored political factors much less. At the domestic level, only political instability 
and political institutions have been examined systematically, mostly in very recent 
research. Political instability and violence should make a country less attractive for FDI, 
since they render the economic and political context less predictable. Regarding domestic 
political institutions, Henisz (2000) has argued that institutions with multiple veto players 
constrain policy change and hence attract more FDI because these institutions increase 
the predictability of policy. Meanwhile, other recent research has focused on regime type 
and found that democracies in fact attract more foreign direct investment, with some 
important caveats. These findings are in contrast to the early literature on FDI, which had 
suggested that multinational companies were attracted to autocracies by their ability to 
suppress labor demands and by the absence of election-induced policy uncertainty. Other 
scholars have found no consistent/significant effects for regime type. 
The research‘s main problem will be to analyze whether political parties compete 
over trade policy, especially the policy that is related to foreign direct investment in 
certain area. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to explore the concepts of 
partisanship and trade policy and their effects on foreign direct investment both in home 
countries (Euro Area countries) and in host countries (Southeast Asian countries). The 
study will be looking at the effects of political party type on foreign direct investment 
whether in home country or in host country at the time of certain political party type 
governs a country. The research is only going to look at the differences outflow and 
inflow of FDI in Euro Area and Southeast Asian countries during five years, after the 
Euro was initiated, and an analysis on other factors that can have an impact on trade 
policies relating to FDI, will not be included. 
The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly 
across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well 
understood. Since governments can alter the policy environment faced by investors, those 
who seek to attract FDI must find ways to assure private investors that their investments 
can prosper. Based on the early post-World War II years, the literature traditionally 
identified the threat of expropriation as the key concern of foreign investors regarding 
developing countries. Yet, while recent expropriations of foreign assets in extractive 
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industries show that such direct threats to property rights remain a possibility, they have 
become rare in recent decades, as the nature of FDI has changed. Instead, more subtle 
government interventions that reduce the profitability of investments have become the 
key political concern of investors. Hence, policies that imply limited government 
intervention in the economy, such as trade and financial openness, should be attractive to 
foreign investors. 
The analytical approach of this research is relatively traditional. First, the 
theoretical literature of partisanship and its effect on trade policy is reviewed in order to 
identify the main hypotheses that may govern the relation between the orientation type of 
political parties and the performance of FDI. After that, the associated empirical literature 
is reviewed to clarify what is known about the phenomenon and to discuss some 
differences of the previous researches that characterize the study of political regime and 
its effect on its economic development policy. Finally, the research makes its own 
empirical analyses. In particular, this research tests a multivariate regression model of the 
relations between the orientation type political parties and foreign direct investment on a 
cross-sectional sample of 248 inward and outward FDI during the 7-years observation 
period. In this connection, it should be stressed that the proposed statistical model 
obviously can be no more that a simplistic attempt to model a piece of market behavior 
because reality is simply too complex to be modeled completely. 
 
Literature Review 
There is a vast literature on the political economy of trade policy. Little of it addresses 
the role of political parties, largely because the main theories of trade policy predict that 
partisan influences should be unimportant. First, trade policy theories that focus on 
interest groups (e.g., specific factors models) suggest partisanship should not matter. If 
trade policy results from the preferences and influence of interest groups, then 
partisanship is likely to be irrelevant because each party tends to represent multiple 
interest groups with different preferences. Instead, the character of the economic interest 
groups and their political influence determine trade policy, for example, Caves (1976) 
argues that when factors are immobile, as they increasingly appear to be since 1945, 
industry level variables, rather than partisanship, should better explain the demand and 
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supply of trade policy.  Alternatively, as Magee, Brock and Young (1989) say in 
discussing the powerless politician effect, trade policy can largely be ―explained by those 
exogenous variables that drive the behavior of special interests and general interests who 
favor or oppose protection‖. Economic sectors organized as special interest groups are 
expected to dominate trade policy, rendering parties irrelevant.  
Partisanship is also unimportant in a second, common set of explanations of trade 
policy that focus on the international system and states‘ positions. The theory of 
hegemonic stability is exemplary here, as are theories that emphasize the size of 
countries. For these theories, a country‗s national position–as, say, a hegemony or a small 
state- determines its trade policy preferences; and political parties within it would not be 
expected to deviate from this national preference. This development contradicts to the 
fact that the government is the key factor in determining the trade policies, whether in the 
context of internal affairs policies or external ones. In other words, there are good reasons 
to believe that there are more to the story about partisanship and trade policy than just a 
simple factor in many factors that determines trade policy.  
Partisanship 
A completely new field of economics opened up once Nordhaus (1975) wrote ―The 
political business cycle‖. The central assumptions of the Nordhaus model are that voters 
are myopic and that party policies are not determined by partisan differences. Rather, a 
governing party capitalizes on voters‘ myopia and runs the economic policy in a way that 
will maximize the probability of being re-elected. Consequently, as an election nears the 
economy should be characterized by increasing growth and falling inflation, while having 
the opposite effect in periods immediately following the election. Therefore, the pure 
existence of elections generates economic fluctuations. In opposition to this view, Hibbs 
(1977) presents a model in which parties also behave ―ideologically‖. Winning elections 
is important, but only to the degree that it enables the party to ―implement policies 
favoring their core constituencies‖. This contrasting theory is called the Partisan Theory. 
It is argued that political parties, as organizers of broad coalitions of interests and 
ideas, have played a key role in the economic policy-making process. There is also wide 
agreement in the literature that governments controlled by conservative or social 
democratic parties have distinct partisan economic objectives that they would prefer to 
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pursue in the absence of any external constraints. Socialist governments are expected to 
intervene extensively in the economy to modify market outcomes and redistributive 
wealth to favor the least advantaged sectors and advance equality in general. 
Conservative parties are generally assumed to develop less interventionist policies and to 
rely on market mechanisms to maximize economic growth and protect individual 
liberties.  
These differences in the parties‘ positions toward the management of the 
economy and the role of governmental policies in sustaining and redistributing economic 
growth derive from a blend of interests (i.e., the redistributive consequences of economic 
policies) and ideas (here mostly in the sense of instrumental economic models) in the 
following way.  In the first place, all political parties prefer to develop policies that 
maximize growth. Since economic growth will increase the real disposable income of the 
core constituencies of the incumbent party, and of all social strata in general, and will 
thus boost the electoral strength of the party in office, it is an unavoidable requirement to 
be met even by those parties with a strong penchant for straightforward redistributive 
policies. In the second place, although always attempting to maximize growth, parties 
adopt distinctive economic strategies depending on their redistributive consequences. 
Partisan preferences vary with respect to the specific strategies that should be followed 
by to foster economic growth precisely because the strategies affect differently the 
welfare of all social and economic strata, and more generally, have distinct consequences 
on the level of economic equality in a given country. On the one hand, left-wing or social 
democratic parties, while still concerned about maximizing growth, especially care about 
the welfare of workers and the less advantaged social sectors  and about equality in 
general. On the other hand, right-wing or conservative parties care about economic 
growth per se regardless of its distributive concerned. 
Finally, even though these distinctive partisan positions about growth and equality 
derive from different preferences toward the distribution of income and wealth in society, 
they depend as well as on the set of existing instrumental models or theories that parties 
have about how the economy works and about what policies governments can use to 
improve economic performance. 
Economic Strategies as Electoral Strategies 
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According to the assumptions of the partisan model, which provide the initial foundation 
of this study, political parties adopt different economic strategies due to the latter‘s 
redistributive effects of different combinations of unemployment and inflation lead left-
wing and right-wing cabinets to choose different macroeconomic policies. In short, 
economic strategies respond to the concerns of the particular electoral constituencies that 
support the party in power. It emphasizes the fact that, besides responding to voter‘s 
preferences, economic policies are employed to build electoral coalitions. 
Conservatives are instead assumed to receive most of their support from relatively 
more qualified workers (or from voters that are asset-holders). Again, as pointed out 
before, mainly because they obtain their support from different constituencies, partisan 
government engage in different economic policies. According to Boix (1998), 
governments eventually have to choose between two alternative economic strategies to 
spur economic growth and sustain the competitiveness of domestic firms in the medium 
run. In one case, governments employ the public sector to raise the level of domestic 
savings and total investment and boost the productivity of capital and labor. In the other 
case, they rely on market mechanisms and private agents to maximize the rate of 
investment and thus foster economic growth. Although equally geared toward improving 
economic performance, each economic strategy has distinct redistributive effects.  
Public investment strategies, developed to equalize conditions without forsaking 
growth, require higher taxes on well-off sectors. Private investment strategies imply a 
reduction in taxes and in current levels of social protection – particularly when 
exogenous shocks exacerbate the employment – equality trade-off latent in all advances 
democracies. The two strategies accordingly receive the support of different parties and 
electoral constituencies. Broadly speaking, social democrats and working-class voters 
rally around active supply-side policies. Conservative and the middle classes defend 
privatization policies and tax reductions. 
An interventionist economic strategy is based on high levels of direct public 
investment, a sizable public business sector, and high taxes (especially on upper-income 
brackets) to pay for these supply-side economic policies. A ―laissez-faire‖ or market-
based economic strategy entails minimizing public spending on investment, selling public 
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firms, and maintaining taxation low and non-distortionary to encourage private 
investment. Table 1 gives a summary of both ideal strategies. 
 
 
Table 1 
Overall Economic Strategies of Parties and Corresponding Policy Instruments 
 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
ECONOMIC STRATEGIES 
Market-Based Interventionist 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
Low rate of public 
investment 
High rate of public 
investment 
Human Capital Formation 
Relies on private sector 
High levels of public 
spending 
Public Business Sector Small or negligible Large  
Tax Policies Low tax rates 
High tax rates 
Regulatory mechanisms to 
foster investment 
 
Growing international competitiveness have convinced policymaking elites of all 
ideological orientation to scale back the level of state intervention in order to free private 
investment, reduce vast inefficiencies, and enable national business to regain world 
markets. In short, growing worldwide economic and financial constraints and the 
internationalization of the economy would have led policymaking elites across the 
industrialized world to embrace a program of thorough deregulation and privatization. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key element of the global economy. FDI is an engine 
of employment, technological progress, productivity improvements, and ultimately 
economic growth. FDI provides both physical capital and employment possibilities that 
may not be available in the host market. More importantly, FDI is a mechanism of 
technology transfer between countries, particularly to the less-developed nations. 
Because of these significant benefits, attracting FDI has become one of the integral parts 
of economic development strategies in many countries. 
FDI is defined as private capital flows from a parent firm to a location outside of 
the parent firm‘s home nation. These investments consist of equity capital, inter-company 
debt, and reinvested earnings. An investment is considered FDI, as opposed to portfolio 
investment, if it is large enough to give the parent firm some amount of control over the 
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management of the enterprise — usually more than 10 percent of the firm. This definition 
is also consistent with the OECD Benchmark Definition (OECD, 1996) as well as the 
UNCTAD definition of FDI (UNCTAD, 2003). Contrary to the common belief that the 
investor needs to control the foreign enterprise, this definition considers the degree of 
influence exercised through the first as well as subsequent transactions between a parent 
company and its foreign affiliate as the main determinate in the definition of FDI. The 
aim to have influence over the target company as well as the fact that not just capital but 
also other resources such as knowledge or management techniques are being transferred 
within a firm rather than externally between firms are the distinctive features of foreign 
direct investment vis-à-vis foreign portfolio investment. For which has no interest in 
managing or directly controlling the investments and is simply based on considerations of 
financial returns on capital. 
FDI, unlike portfolio investments, has long time horizons and is generally not 
done for speculative purposes, but rather to serve domestic markets, exploit natural 
resources, or provide platforms to serve world markets through exports, as it can be 
summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
Source: Yu Zhu [2005] 
Figure 1: Types of International Capital Movements 
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This expansion through FDI can take a number of different forms such as green-
field investment, where a new affiliate is being created, the expansion of an existing 
affiliate, or a cross-border merger and acquisition, which involves a change in the control 
of assets and operations of the merged or acquired firm. Meanwhile in the EU countries, 
flows of FDI fluctuate considerably from one year to the next – partly as a function of 
economic fortunes, with FDI flows generally increasing during times of rapid growth, 
while disinvestment is more likely during periods of recession as companies focus on 
core activities in their domestic market. Inflows of FDI from non-Community countries 
into the EU-25 were valued at EUR 145,022 million in 2006, which was 54% more than 
in 2005. Outward flows of FDI from the EU-25 to non-Community countries were valued 
at EUR 202,223 million. Despite the rapid increase in inward flows of FDI, the EU-25 
remained a net investor abroad with net outflows of EUR 57,201 million in 2006 (down 
from EUR 91,810 in 2005).  
FDI inflows to South, East and South-East Asia, and Oceania maintained their 
upward trend in 2006, reaching a new high of US$187 billion, an increase of 13% over 
2005. Investments in high-tech industries by transnational corporations (TNCs) are 
growing rapidly, particularly in China. Meanwhile, other countries, including India, are 
attracting increasing FDI for traditional manufacturing. At the sub-regional level, a shift 
continues in favor of South and South-East Asia. China, Hong Kong (China) and 
Singapore retained their positions as the three largest recipients of FDI in the region. 
India surpassed the Republic of Korea and became the fourth largest recipient. Outward 
FDI from the region surged with China consolidating its position as an important source 
of FDI. India is rapidly catching up, with 2006 FDI outflows almost doubling. China and 
India are challenging the dominance of Asia‘s newly industrializing economies as the 
main sources of FDI in the developing world. One of the most significant developments 
in FDI over the past two or three years has involved natural resources and related 
industries. Despite some unfavorable developments for foreign investors in such 
industries, high demand for natural resources – and, as a result, the opening up of new 
potentially profitable opportunities in the primary sector – are likely to attract further FDI 
to the extractive industries. 
Determinants of FDI 
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John Dunning‘s ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) framework is generally 
considered the paradigmatic theory of the multinational firm‘s investment decisions, 
where multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest internationally for reasons of ownership, 
location, and internalization (Dunning, 1989). Firms have ownership advantages when 
they have access to some assets or processes that provide some advantages over existing 
firms in the foreign market. These can be physical, for example patented products or 
production processes, or more intangible, such as global brand name recognition. 
Multinational firms invest abroad to exploit these firm-specific advantages in foreign 
markets and secure higher returns. 
Firms may also be motivated to invest abroad because of locational advantages. 
Firms often invest in production facilities in foreign markets because transportation costs 
are too high to serve these markets through exports. This could either be directly related 
to the physical nature of the good, as with a high bulk item or a service that needs to be 
provided on site, or because of policy factors such as tariff rates, import restrictions, or 
issues of market access that make physical investment advantageous over serving the 
market through exports. The locational advantage could also be related to the actual 
endowments of the host location — either the richness of its natural resources or the high 
quality and low cost of its labor force. 
The third and most complex factor is that of internalization advantages. Although 
the other two OLI factors highlight reasons why firms would move production to a 
foreign location, they do not give any reason as to why a firm would simply not license a 
foreign producer to make the item for the parent firm. A multinational company could 
simply provide the technology needed for the production process and the blueprints for 
the product to a local firm. This concept of internalization advantages captures the firm-
specific motivations for a firm choosing to produce the product within the organization 
itself in a foreign location. 
Closely related to Dunning‘s work, other scholars have developed a number of 
theoretical models to explain firms‘ decisions to invest abroad. These models can be 
roughly classified as theories based on ―vertical‖ firms, ―horizontal‖ firms, and the 
―knowledge-capital model‖ of multinational firms. Vertical firms separate production 
activities by the level of capital intensity, producing different goods and services at 
 Page 13 
 
different physical locations. Although these theories are important contributions to the 
understanding of multinationals‘ investment decisions, theories based on vertical 
multinationals have failed to account for the existence of firms replicating the production 
of the same goods and services in different physical locations. 
The subsequent account of FDI determinants focuses on location-specific factors. 
Firm-specific factors are ignored, as host country governments cannot influence them. As 
noted before, the knowledge is fairly limited as concerns the relative importance of 
different location-specific FDI determinants. The relative importance of some 
determinants is likely to vary between different types of FDI, i.e. resource-seeking, 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. Furthermore, the relative importance of FDI 
determinants may change over time, e.g. due to ongoing globalization. Figure 2 groups 
important location-specific factors into three categories, i.e. overall policy framework for 
FDI, economic determinants and business facilitation measures. 
 
 
Source: Nunnenkamp [2001] 
Figure 2: Selected Host Country Determinants of FDI 
 
The Effect of FDI on home economies 
Such a rapid increase in outward FDI has raised some concern among policy-makers and 
researchers, primarily about the impact of outward FDI on the domestic economy, and 
potential implications. One major impact of outward FDI is the trade effect, particularly 
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on the exports of a home country. As for the relationship between FDI and trade, 
theoretical arguments have made the two complement or substitute each other. Earlier 
theoretical efforts, like Mundell (1957), highlight the trade-substituting nature of FDI, 
and many recent efforts tend to favor FDI being trade complementing. As Petri (1995) 
and Pfaffermayr (1996) argue, however, the relationship is not predictable because the 
trade impact of FDI can be influenced by a range of factors, such as firm strategies, 
motivations for FDI, and government policies. Therefore, the relationship between FDI 
and trade policy remains a subject requiring empirical investigation. 
The Effect of FDI on host economies 
A number of studies that explore cross-country economic growth have argued that one 
important potential engine of growth for developing countries is foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Theoretically, FDI from developed countries to developing countries (host 
economies) is a vehicle not only for providing physical capital, but also for transferring 
advanced technology, managerial skill, and innovative products. Foreign affiliates from 
developed countries may replace inefficient firms in developing countries. However, the 
advanced technology adopted by the developed countries' affiliates may also spread to 
local firms and yield technological benefits to developing countries, which promotes the 
host country's economic growth. 
The benefits of FDI come in a package that includes technology transfer as well 
as capital flows. As foreign affiliates hire local (host country) workers and operate in the 
host country market, certain advanced knowledge or technology can spread to local firms. 
When this happens, technology or productivity of industries in the host country is 
improved. Endogenous growth theory indicates that technology progress leads to long run 
economic growth and supports the idea that FDI plays an important role in the growth of 
host countries, especially developing countries. Total FDI inflows are often used to test 
the impact on growth and all types of FDI inflows have been assumed to have the same 
impact on host country's economic growth. On the other hand, the entry of foreign 
companies may decrease the market share of domestic companies and may raise entry 
costs, especially in underdeveloped industries. 
Government Incentive on FDI in Practice 
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Which incentives-benefits does government use to attract capital? These elements of the 
economic policy may be mentioned here that have the purpose of improving payback of 
investments (in particular FDI), or reducing their costs and/or risk. Incentives may be 
fiscal, financial, or other. These incentives influence mostly the site selection for new 
investments (as well capacity expansion); capital flows relating to mergers and 
acquisitions are hardly affected by the incentive system. 
According to the literature, FDI incentives in the narrow sense include fiscal, 
financial, and other incentives. In many cases, governments attach various conditions and 
performance requirements (PR) to the incentives to assure that FDI ―delivers‖ the 
expected positive impacts with greater probability, and also to direct investments into 
strategic sectors, activities or regions for industrial policy considerations. Such PR‘s may 
include local added value requirement, export requirement, minimum investment 
requirement, the requirement of domestic participation, employment-related 
requirements, technology transfer requirement, R&D requirement etc. Multilateral 
(GATT, WTO) and regional conventions impose considerable restriction of the 
applicability of PR. 
Table 2 
Key FDI Incentives in the Narrow Sense 
 
 
Source: Sass [2003] 
 
In summary, empirical studies reveal about the relationship of broader and narrower FDI 
regulations that capital flow itself is determined by the factors influencing FDI in the 
broad sense. The size of the market, its growth rate, the production costs, the level of 
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qualifications, political and economic stability, the regulatory framework, and the 
economic policies indirectly affecting FDI are the most important considerations in 
attracting investments. The role of incentives is important mostly when making a choice 
between areas similar in the previously mentioned respects. That is, specific incentives 
may direct investments regionally, between two similar countries, or within a single 
country. 
Partisanship and Foreign Direct Investment 
According to Pinto (2005), FDI policies of OECD countries can be explained by looking 
at the left-right orientation of the government in power. A party‗s position on a 
unidimensional left-right ideological scale will have an important, predictable impact on 
its trade policy position.  In developed countries, left parties should take positions more 
favorable to protection, and right ones should be more free trade-oriented. 
What generates a party‘s preferred-policy position, especially on trade? Parties 
tend to locate themselves in terms of domestic political debates along some 
unidimensional left-right ideological spectrum in order to attract voters who harbor 
similar positions.  A party‗s general ideological position arises from its historical position 
on a number of cleavages in society. For most OECD countries, a central cleavage around 
which they formed was class. Parties representing the working class fought their way into 
the system and into government in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  These left-wing 
parties typically reflected the class-based preferences of their core constituents, workers.  
In addition, as Lipset/Rokkan (1967) argued years ago, these old class cleavages persist 
in the party systems of today. Despite vast social, political, and economic changes, the 
party systems of the 1990s looked similar to those of the 1940s. Parties have been able to 
keep large bodies of citizens identifying with them over a long period of time and to 
renew their core clienteles from generation to generation.   
The assumption that governments have partisan (and electoral) incentives in 
regulating economic activity is pervasive in the literature that explores the links between 
politics and macro-economic management: Hibbs (1977, 1992) and Tufte (1978) are the 
precursors in this tradition. Political parties build and nurture ties to groups of voters, 
whether organized or not, and when in government tend to deliver policies valued by 
those groups for material (or ideological) reasons.  
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Foreign Direct Investment Policy in European Union 
According to UNCTAD (2003), the most advanced FDI policy competition framework 
exists within the European Union. It occupies a preeminent position both as an inward as 
well as outward investment location (accounting for about 57 and 60 percent of global 
FDI inflows and outflows in 2002, respectively) and possesses a relatively cohesive and 
coordinated policy in the area of FDI competition. While again the main actors are the 
nation states as well as the regions, on a supra-national level, the EU (through its 
Directorate-General Competition) exerts substantial influence through its competition 
policies in areas such as state aid and regional aid. In addition, it indirectly influences 
other factors crucial in investor decision-making, such as taxation and labor market 
regulations in relation to FDI promotion. 
That said, the existing FDI policy framework in Europe is not without challenges. 
These challenges emerge from two fronts: first, the EU needs to reconcile its objectives 
of setting competition within limits and establishing level playing fields for all its 
member states with the pressing goal of remaining competitive on a global scale. The 
essence of this dilemma was summed up by a senior official of the Irish Development 
Agency (IDA) in response to the recent toughening of EU rules on subsidies for FDI 
projects. It is a tradeoff between reducing state aid to large projects and ensuring that the 
EU remains competitive. Although in principle we are all in favor of a level playing field 
with regard to investment incentives, in practice this will make non-EU countries, like 
Switzerland and Singapore, more competitive by comparison. 
 
Methodology 
Data and Model Specification 
In order to investigate the relationship between the government partisanship and FDI 
policies, a range of data are needed. The countries studied in this research are Euro Area 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Southeast Asian countries, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Although other Southeast 
Asian countries (and other emerging countries outside Asia) are also the recipients of FDI 
inflows from Euro Area countries, the five Southeast Asian countries considered here as 
the most stable democratic countries in that area. 
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Therefore, for the countries included in this research sample, it is set some 
criteria, as follows each country of Euro Area must have joined the Eurozone at least on 
January 1, 2001, which is the primary data source used in this study, these countries 
should have FDI flows to Southeast Asian countries during the period of 2000 - 2006, 
and each country must be identified in Political Data Yearbook for its government 
partisanship type.  
The sample selection process is outlined in Table 3. The final sample consists of 
248 observations from 16 countries (11 Euro Area countries and 5 Southeast Asian 
countries). In general, the sample is representative of European FDI flows (developed 
countries) into developing countries (in this case are Southeast Asian countries).  
Table 3 
Sample Selection Process  
 
1. Initial sample (Euro Area countries, which are listed in 
UNCTAD and OECD Reports during 2000 – 2006 have FDI 
outflows into Southeast Asian countries) 
385 
2. Removed from the sample because of having negative FDI 
outflow 
(19) 
3. Removed from the sample because an incomplete data, such 
as GDP, Export – Import, and Unemployment rate.  
(118) 
4. Final sample 248 
 
Time Horizon 
The reason for choosing the time horizon 2000 - 2006 is mainly that the period of post-
2000 is believed as the period of recovery of the crisis. The research chooses to 7-years 
observation due to the fact and intention to portrait the post Asian financial crisis 
environment. In addition, the 7-years observation is hoped to be able to give enough 
information of the relationship between government partisanship and FDI flows at the 
time of recovering Southeast Asian economics. 
Population 
The research considers the population of the study to be all FDI flows from Euro Area 
countries into Southeast Asian countries where these flows are recorded in UNCTAD and 
OECD Annually Report data, and at the time period chosen. For each sample FDI flows, 
the following items are collected FDI outward (Euro Area countries) and FDI inward 
(Southeast Asian countries), government partisanship type, and other control variables, 
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such as GDP, Export – Import, Population, and Unemployment rate. The sources that 
have been used to find the required data are UNCTAD, OECD Annually Report, 
European Central Bank Report, Political Data Yearbook, and Country Profile. 
 
Multivariate regression method to find the influence of independent variable 
The research carries out a multivariate regression to assess the relationship between 
government partisanship and FDI policies. The dependent variable is the FDI, and is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the annual FDI outflows and inflows of each country. 
Many studies have used FDI in measuring trade policy (as examples see Pinto 
(2005) and Pinto & Pinto (2006)). Milner and Judkins (2002) argue that FDI is a 
common and rational choice in investigating the effect of partisanship on trade 
policies, due to its characteristics that are strong tied to the government political 
economy. The natural log transformation of FDI is used to mitigate possible problems 
with the sample distribution of the amount of FDI. 
Six sets of explanatory variables are included in an attempt to capture different 
effects. The first explanatory variable is the government partisanship variable. Since a 
country‘s FDI flow is likely to be affected by many factors other than the government 
partisanship, the remaining five sets of variables are included in an attempt to control for 
these other effects. These variables are used to ―isolate‖ the effects of the partisanship on 
trade policy.  In order to make sure that the multivariate regression model is valid, the 
research will conduct three classical regression validity tests; there are multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 2003). 
Model I 
Since the underlying hypothesis is that FDI outflow is a function of the government 
partisanship of the home countries, the FDI outflow is regressed on home countries‘ 
partisanship type and other control variables. The first hypothesis proposes that left 
parties in Euro Area countries will prefer to apply trade policies that are favorable to 
protectionism (no-inward FDI). This hypothesis is tested by regressing the dependent 
variable, ln FDI outward against the home government partisanship (Euro Area countries) 
and control variables: 
Ln FDI Outwardit  = α0 + 0 EAPTit + 1 GDPit  + 2 Opennessit  + 3 Employmentit 
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+ 4 Populationit + 5 Unemploymentit + eit   ………………      (1) 
where: 
It =  the i-th firm in period t 
Ln FDI  =  natural log transformation of FDI Outward 
EAPT =  Euro Area government partisanship type  
 
FDI outward is the outflow of foreign direct investment as a proportion of total 
investment in country i (Euro Area countries) to host country.   
EAPT (Euro Area Partisanship Type) is a dummy variable indicating whether a left wing 
party is in government in country i at time t. A value 1 is coded when the party of the 
chief executive is listed as Left in the database of political institutions (Clarke et al. 
2000).  
GDP = natural logarithm of GDP per capita. A country‗s level of development (as 
indicated by the natural log of its GDP per capita) may also influence the nature of trade 
policy.  
Openness = the sum of export and imports as a percentage of GDP (from WDI, World 
Development Indicators, World Bank). The liberalization of a country‘s foreign 
economic transactions is expected to influence positively the outward FDI activities of its 
firms (Rodriguez, 2000; Hau, 1999).  
Employment = employment rate (from WDI, World Development Indicators, World 
Bank and OECD Annually Report). The outward direct investments, in theory, leads to 
the loss of domestic jobs and hence the depression of employment in the investing 
country.  
Population = natural logarithm of country population. The country‗s relative size and 
power may shape its trade policy. Parties in smaller countries, as measured here by their 
population (ln Pop), are expected to be more favorable to free trade. 
Unemployment = unemployment rate (from WDI, World Development Indicators, World 
Bank and OECD Annually Report). The investment environment determinants, one of 
them is unemployment rate, play a part of macro-economic policies that the government 
forms to define its FDI policies. 
Model II 
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To test for the hypothesized relationship between government partisanship and FDI 
policies in Southeast Asian countries (host countries), the Euro Area countries‘ 
partisanship variable is augmented to the regression model: 
Ln FDI Inward-SAit  = α0 + 0 EAPTit + 1 SAPTit + 2 GDP-SAit  + 3 Openness-
SAit  + 4 Employment-SAit + 5 Population-SAit + 6 Unemployment-SAit + eit  … (2) 
where: 
SAPT =  Southeast Asian government partisanship type  
 
This model is intended to test the second hypothesis that proposes left parties in 
Southeast Asian countries are likely to have trade policy that is more favorable 
protectionism, while right parties are likely to have trade policy that is more supportive of 
inward FDI. In general, the research will use all relevant data of 16 countries (11 
countries of Euro Area and 5 Southeast Asian countries) and 267 observations as a final 
sample and it will be done in two steps. First step will test the first hypothesis, to find 
whether government partisanship type of Euro Area countries will influence its FDI 
policies. This step tests the underlying hypothesis that trade policies is a function of the 
distribution of power in political economy among left parties and right parties. Second 
step will test the relationship between Southeast Asian countries as host countries and 
FDI policies. This step will explore the possibility influence of host country partisanship 
and its trade policies. These two steps will be done by using multiple regression method 
to find the influence of independent variable, as follows Euro Area countries‘ 
partisanship (dummy variable), Southeast Asian countries‘ partisanship (dummy 
variable), and Foreign Domestic Investment (variable). In addition, the model includes 
control variables that are used as explaining variable; they are Gross Domestic Product 
(variable), Openness (variable), Employment (variable), Population (variable), and 
Unemployment (variable). 
 
Result 
Three classical regression validity tests 
To detect multicollinearity in this research, we used Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 
each independent variable. If the VIF of a variable exceeds 10, which will happen if R  
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exceeds 0.90, that variable is said be highly collinear. Normally, the closer VIF is to 1, 
the greater evidence that an independent variable is not collinear with other independent 
variables (Gujarati, 2003). 
Table 4A 
Multicollinearity Test – Model I 
 
No. Variable VIF Conclusion 
1 EA countries‘ partisanship 1.131 Not exist multicollinearity 
2 Gross Domestic Product 3.560 Not exist multicollinearity 
3 Openness 2.597 Not exist multicollinearity 
4 Employment 2.150 Not exist multicollinearity 
5 Population 1.256 Not exist multicollinearity 
6 Unemployment 1.019 Not exist multicollinearity 
 
Table 4B 
Multicollinearity Test – Model II 
 
No. Variable VIF Conclusion 
1 EA countries‘ partisanship 1.241 Not exist multicollinearity 
2 SA countries‘ partisanship 2.025 Not exist multicollinearity 
3 Gross Domestic Product 1.533 Not exist multicollinearity 
4 Openness 1.226 Not exist multicollinearity 
5 Employment 1.710 Not exist multicollinearity 
6 Population 4.135 Not exist multicollinearity 
7 Unemployment 2.494 Not exist multicollinearity 
 
The autocorrelation test for the presence of first-order autocorrelation is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. As shown in Table 4C and Table 4D, there are no tendencies of the 
presence of autocorrelation in the multivariate regression model 
Table 4C 
Autocorrelation Test – Model I 
DW statistics 
DW table 
(n = 248 ; k = 6), α level = 1% 
Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du <  d  < (4- du) 
1.781 1.613 1.735 2.265 2.387 Free from autocorrelation 
 
Table 4D 
Autocorrelation Test – Model II 
DW statistics 
DW table 
(n = 248 ; k = 7), α level = 1% 
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Value dL du 4 – du 4 – dL Criteria du <  d  < (4- du) 
1.755 1.603 1.746 2.254 2.397 Free from autocorrelation 
 
As shown in Table 4E and Table 4F, relatively there are no statistically significant 
correlations amongst independent variables that indicate heteroscedasticity‘s presence 
(Yin & Carroll, 1990). There are only statistically significant correlation in variable GDP 
and Employment (Table 4E), which are control variables and in this research, both 
variables are not tested in hypotheses.  It means that all multivariate regression models 
are relatively free from any disturbance that is able to obscure the analysis. 
Table 4E 
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model I 
 
Spearman’s rho ARES 
Independent Variable 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed) N Significance 
EA countries‘ partisanship 0.103 0.107 247  
Gross Domestic Product - 0.240** 0.000 247 Significant at the 0.01 level 
Openness - 0.092 0.147 247  
Employment 0.146* 0.022 247 Significant at the 0.05 level 
Population - 0.018 0.775 247  
Unemployment - 0.076 0.236 247  
 
Table 4F 
Heteroscedasticity Test – Model II 
 
Spearman’s rho ARES 
Independent Variable 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed) N Significance 
EA countries‘ partisanship 0.062 0.335 247  
SA countries‘ partisanship - 0.002 0.977 247  
Gross Domestic Product 0.022 0.726 247  
Openness - 0.082 0.200 247  
Employment - 0.033 0.601 247  
Population - 0.036 0.572 247  
Unemployment - 0.002 0.969 247  
 
 
The Effect of Euro Area’s Partisanship on FDI Policies 
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Correlation analysis (Table 5) shows that some explanatory variables are 
significantly correlated. First, there is significant positive correlation between the EAPT 
(Euro Area Partisanship) and Openness variables (0.308), even though the correlation is 
quite small. This may be quite surprising since left wing governments normally are 
expected to be more favorable to protectionism or have negative relation with FDI 
outward policies. However, Garrett (1998) demonstrates that when left-wing parties 
control governments and labor market institutions are strongly institutionalized, they are 
associated with big traders. He finds that, during 1980‘s when the Republican Party had 
enjoyed the long presidencies, an average foreign trade value over GDP of the United 
States was the lowest (19%) among fifteen OECD countries, followed by 27% of Japan, 
whereas all European countries except Italy (43%) had scored the economic openness of 
total trade above 50%. The strong correlation between trade expansion and left-labor 
power is also warranted in his statistical analysis. However, his findings about the effect 
of left-wing parties on economic openness are conditional on domestic labor market 
institutions. It happens only when labor market institutions are encompassing, social 
democratic corporatism is consistent with accounting for big governments (i.e., large 
deficits). 
Table 5 
Coefficient Correlation 
Model I 
 
Independent 
Variable 
EAPT GDPEA OPENEA EMPLOYEA POPULEA UNEMPLOYEA 
EAPT 1.000 .138* .308** -.077 -.155* -.048 
GDPEA .138* 1.000 .663** -.623** -.140* .090 
OPENEA .308** .663** 1.000 -.203** -.296** .022 
EMPLOYEA -.077 -.623** -.203 1.000 .250** -.104 
POPULEA -.155* -.140* -.296** .250** 1.000 .040 
UNEMPLOYEA -.048 .090 .022 -.104 .040 1.000 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The GDP and Openness variables are also positively correlated significantly (0.663). This 
statistic confirms the Euro Area countries‘ productivity, which suggests that the large 
portion of its GDP comes from its international trade activities. Romer (1989) posits the 
positive relationship between openness and economic growth as a stylized fact. On the 
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other hand, in this investigation provides an interesting phenomenon that is contrary with 
common assumptions. Normally, it is said that bigger countries have more openness in its 
trade than small countries. A significant negative correlation between Openness and 
Population that represents country size (-0.296) support this phenomena. This implies 
that the small countries in Euro Area are able to optimize its productivity by having more 
international trade activities than the big ones. It supports what Alesina and Wacziarg 
(1998) find in their investigation that smaller countries have a larger share of public 
consumption in GDP, and are also more open to trade. 
A significantly negative correlation between GDP and Employment (-0.623) can 
be explained by the real appreciation of the Euro phenomena. The real appreciation of the 
Euro caused by a rising terms of trade has made imports cheaper relative to domestic 
output. Domestic residents are likely to substitute away from domestic output to imports. 
This substitution effect may offset the income effect on GDP. Consequently, the level of 
domestic product will grow slower and affects the employment rate. It is known as the 
negative employment elasticity for the whole economy, is that employment contracts 
when GDP rises. 
In order to test whether Euro Area countries‘ partisanship affect FDI policies, the 
research runs a multivariate regression model that puts Euro Area‘s FDI outflow as 
dependent variable. Table 6 presents the regression results for the Euro Area countries‘ 
partisanship test (that is, Model I). As can be seen from this table, there is an interesting 
evidence of a positive relation between government partisanship and FDI outflow. The 
coefficient on the EAPT variable is positive, even though is not statistically significant (t 
= 1.121). 
Table 6 
The Effect of Euro Area’s Partisanship on FDI Policies 
Model I 
 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R
2
 
Constant -1.991 -2.007  .046  
EAPT .207 1.121  .263  
GDPEA .516** 2.322  .021  
OPENEA .251 1.213  .227  
EMPLOYEA 1.208* 3.221  .001  
POPULEA 4.531*** 1.748  .082  
UNEMPLOYEA -7.900** -2.535  .012  
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MODEL 
6.727*  
(F-value) 
5.70  
(F-table) 
0.144 
* = significant at α level  = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575) 
** = significant at α level  = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959) 
*** = significant at α level  = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644) 
 
This positive relation is different from the previous studies that suggest that left parties 
are favorable to protectionism. It seems that partisanship in the Euro Area countries does 
not have any effect to its trade policy or FDI policy. In other words, the European Union 
policies present another constraint upon a government‘s ability to change trade policies 
since countries in the EU have agreed to relinquish their own national trade policies. It 
can be looked in Article 133 – Treaty of Nice that regulates the trade policies among EU 
members, thus the type of government partisanship does not influence the Euro Area 
countries‘ trade policy. It can also be referred that globalization (meaning the integration 
of national economies into an international one) has surged greatly in the past few 
decades. This situation has led to a convergence in the economic policy orientations of 
many countries. For instance, Boix (2000) and Iversen (1999) show that partisan 
differences over macroeconomic policies have declined lately. 
The model regression explains approximately 14.4% of the variation in the 
dependent variable. Consistent with the country size argument, the Population variable in 
the regression has a significant positive coefficient (t-statistic = 1.748), suggesting that 
larger countries have higher FDI outflows. This is consistent with Katzenstein (1985), 
Garrett [1998], and empirical evidence obtained by Mansfield and Busch (1995). 
The significant negative coefficient on Unemployment (t-statistic = -2.535) and at 
the same time, a significant positive coefficient on Employment (t-statistic = 3.221) 
reveal a consistent indication with the hypothesis that FDI stabilizes employment at home 
and enables the investing firms to keep world market share. Lipsey (1994) finds that 
those with higher shares of production overseas have higher employment at home relative 
to home production. In other words, the Euro Area‘s FDI outflow has created 
employment and reduced unemployment. 
The GDP variable which proxies for country growth has a positive and significant 
coefficient (t-statistic = 2.332). This consistent with the investigation results of Grosse 
(1997) and Jensen (2006) that demonstrate countries with higher per capita GDP are 
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expected to promote future MNC involvement, as growth is more sustainable. It also 
represents the wealth of a country or the ability to invest abroad. 
The positive but insignificant coefficient on Openness may be due to the fact that 
the independent variables included in the models overlap and capture more than one 
effect. In this case, a these variables may proxy for the growth simultaneously. In 
particular, besides capturing the trade activities‘ effect, Openness variable may also 
proxy for the effect of economic growth. As a result, the GDP variable, which is often 
proxied as economic growth indicator, may also reflect the degree of country‘s openness.  
The Effect of Southeast Asian Countries’ Partisanship on FDI Policies 
There is significant positive correlation between the SAPT (Southeast Asian Partisanship) 
and Population in Southeast Asian countries (0.141), even though the correlation is quite 
small, as it can be seen in Table 7. This may be quite surprising since averagely in 
Southeast Asian region right-wing governments are the ruling parties since the last 
decades (Bale & Biezen, 2009). The negative and significant correlation between SAPT 
and Unemployment (0.218) reflects the inability of left-wing parties in Southeast Asian 
region in creating jobs to its constituents, labor class. Consequently, the ruling parties in 
this region are right-wing parties. 
The GDP and Population variables are also positively correlated significantly 
(0.152). This statistic confirms the Southeast Asian countries‘ productivity is inline with 
its country size. It can be said that bigger countries have more economic growth by 
utilizing its size than small countries. A significantly negative correlation between GDP 
and Employment (0.157) suggests that the economic growth, which Southeast Asian 
countries have enjoyed in the last decades, has also created higher employment rate. 
Table 7 
Coefficient Correlation 
Model II 
 
Independent 
Variable 
EAPT SAPT GDPSA OPENSA EMPLOYSA POPULSA UNEMPLOYSA 
EAPT 1.000 .134* .019 .103 .002 .232** .208** 
SAPT .134* 1.000 .092 .071 -.034 .141* .218** 
GDPSA .019 .092 1.000 .108 .157* .152* -.164** 
OPENSA .103 .071 .108 1.000 .059 .127* -.082 
EMPLOYSA .002 -.034 .157* .059 1.000 .276** -.152* 
POPULSA .232** .141* .152* .127* .276** 1.000 .622** 
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UNEMPLOYSA .208** .218** -.164** -.082 -.152* .622** 1.000 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The next stage of analysis involves testing the relationship as developed in the second 
hypothesis. Table 8 contains the regression results of the Southeast Asian countries‘ 
partisanship model where ln (FDI) is regressed against Euro Area countries‘ partisanship 
(EAPT), Southeast Asian countries‘ partisanship (SAPT), and control variables. The 
coefficient on EAPT is negative but insignificant. The coefficient on SAPT is positive 
and significant.  
Table 8 
The Effect of Southeast Asian’s Partisanship on FDI Policies 
Model II 
 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R
2
 
Constant .241 .379  .705  
EAPT -.013 -.075  .940  
SAPT 1.107* 4.060  .000  
GDPSA .452 1.579  .116  
OPENSA -.059 -.276  .782  
EMPLOYSA -2.622 -.698  .486  
POPULSA .077 .430  .668  
UNEMPLOYSA 9.598** 1.769  .078  
MODEL 
7.818*  
(F-value) 
5.70  
(F-table) 
0.186 
* = significant at α level  = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575) 
** = significant at α level  = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959) 
*** = significant at α level  = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644) 
 
This positive relation between partisanship in Southeast Asian countries and FDI 
policies is different from the previous studies that suggest that left-wing parties are 
favorable to protectionism. It seems that whatever ruling parties governing in Southeast 
Asian countries, those parties have a strong preference to attract foreign investment to 
accelerate the economic growth. In other words, these countries put economic growth 
goal above political preferences. It can also be referred that economic integration has 
surged greatly in the past few decades. This situation has led to a convergence in the 
economic policy orientations of many countries. For instance, under the threat of 
international competition and in order to maximize the dynamic gains from FDI, Viet 
Nam (one of ASEAN members) has to reorient its policies and emphasize a shift toward 
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targeting efficiency-seeking investments and developing more advanced links with TNC 
(transnational corporation) regional and global value chains. This new approach would 
benefit from a full-scale development of the ASEAN Free Trade Area - AFTA (providing 
access to a regional market) and the ASEAN Investment Area - AIA (securing 
capabilities in ASEAN countries), as well as other regional trade and investment 
initiatives. 
The most significant attempt at economic cooperation in the area of FDI is the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), created in October 1998. Rather than merely expanding 
existing programs in the new context of AFTA like the AICO, the AIA was designed to 
enhance a process of FDI policy liberalization, promotion, and, to some extent, 
harmonization across ASEAN Member Countries, as well as having certain investment 
facilitation features. It covers five sectors: manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, mining, 
and quarrying, as well as services incidental to the five sectors (―Services Incidental‖). 
Thus, its scope is far larger than any other program; moreover, it will likely be an 
essential pillar in the building of the AEC (ASEAN Economic Community). 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) to cooperate in promoting inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
the need to enhance individual country and regional competitiveness through 
cooperation, thereby promoting ASEAN as an investment regional model of attracting 
foreign direct investment. A linked reason is that, because of the region's integration 
process, it is natural to include investment given that trade arrangements and other 
aspects of economic cooperation are already part of the region's integration agenda. 
Clearly, investment cooperation is a subset of a larger set of regional integration 
arrangements, but one that can help strengthen the overall integration process. The value 
of these arrangements, however, depends on the degree to which FDI and transnational 
corporations' (TNCs) regional operation strategies are centered on (or are evolving 
toward) using combined regional locational advantages (differential levels of resources, 
human capital, cheap labor, and markets in an area of 450 million people) to create value 
chains across the region (and beyond). 
The second model regression explains approximately 18.6% of the variation in the 
dependent variable. Consistent with the country size argument, the Population variable in 
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the regression has a significant positive coefficient (t-statistic = 1.748), suggesting that 
larger countries as host countries have higher FDI inflows from Euro Area countries. This 
is inline with the investigation results of Katzenstein (1985), Garrett (1998), and 
empirical evidence obtained by Mansfield and Busch (1995) that reveal large countries 
actively receive more direct investments as host countries than countries with small 
population do. 
The significant positive coefficient on Unemployment (t-statistic = 1.769) and at 
the same time, a negative but insignificant coefficient on Employment (t-statistic = -
0.698) are different from the hypothesis that FDI becomes a key aspect of the developing 
countries‘ outward-oriented development strategy, as investment is considered as crucial 
element for output growth and employment generation. This phenomenon is the same to 
what happened in South America. Most investment, in particular in Argentina and Brazil 
went into already existing companies as a result of privatization, deregulation and 
increased merger and acquisition (M & A), especially in the service sector. FDI in the 
service and manufacturing sector often combined with modernization and rationalization 
measures leading to labor shedding. In addition, decades of protection led to a slack labor 
force, which was reduced during the privatization and modernization process of the 
1990s, so that the overall impact on employment was minimal or even negative. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
One issue raised in the discussion is the presence of significant correlation amongst some 
of the explanatory variables. It has been suggested that this correlation may create a 
problem of multicollinearity, and consequently model misspecification. The problem 
with multicollinearity is essentially the lack of sufficient information in the sample to 
permit accurate estimation of the individual parameters. It has been suggested that 
multicollinearity need not necessarily create a problem (Maddala, 1992). One way of 
testing for the impact of multicollinearity is by dropping the explanatory variables that 
are highly correlated. Hence, the highly correlated variables are removed one at a time to 
test the sensitivity of the results.  
First, the study excludes from the Model I the Openness and Employment 
variables that are highly correlated with the EAPT, GDP, and Population variables 
(Model I). Next, in Model II the Population and Unemployment variables are excluded 
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due to its high correlations with almost other independent variables. Table 9 presents 
these results. 
 
Table 9A 
Sensitivity Analysis – Omitted OPENNESS & EMPLOYMENT from the Model I 
 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R
2
 
Constant 1.420 2.200  .029  
EAPT .118 .621  .535  
GDPEA .050 .302  .763  
POPULEA .411** 2.211  .028  
UNEMPLOYEA -8.242** -2.562  .011  
MODEL 
4.849* 
(F-value) 
3.32 
(F-table) 
0.074 
* = significant at α level  = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575) 
** = significant at α level  = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959) 
*** = significant at α level  = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644) 
 
Table 9B 
Sensitivity Analysis – Omitted POPULATION and UNEMPLOYMENT from the Model II 
 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic F Significance R
2
 
Constant .972 1.991  .048  
EAPT .094 .557  .578  
SAPT 1.318* 6.335  .000  
GDPSA .093 .380  .704  
OPENSA -.076 -.379  .705  
EMPLOYSA -2.056 -.679  .498  
MODEL 
9.506* 
(F-value) 
3.02 
(F-table) 
0.165 
* = significant at α level  = 1% (t>2.575 or t<-2.575) 
** = significant at α level  = 5% (t>1.959 or t<-1.959) 
*** = significant at α level  = 10% (t>1.644 or t<-1.644) 
 
From Table 9 (A-B), it can be seen the regression results of Omitted Variable-Model I 
and II are quite similar to those of the joint model as presented in Table 8. In particular, 
the coefficient on EAPT in Model I is still positive and statistically insignificant. The 
SAPT coefficient estimate for Model II is significantly positive. The coefficient on the 
Population and Unemployment in Model I are is significant when Openness and 
Employment variables are omitted. However, the sign remains consistent across all 
models. All other coefficients‘ significances are similar to those of the estimated model, 
except EAPT in model II. When the Population and Unemployment variables are 
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omitted, the coefficient on the EAPT variable changes its direction, from negative to 
positive, however, it is still insignificant. It can be concluded that the influence existence 
of government partisanship on FDI policies, however, it is out of the assumed 
expectation. The influence becomes less significant when we do not have any 
information about this phenomenon.  
Generally, the multivariate regression results less support the prior researches in 
certain degree. The results are not as the research has predicted it before, the government 
partisanship less affect FDI policies as a political economy to increase economic growth. 
The partisanship of Euro Area countries and the Southeast Asian countries, especially the 
left wing ruling parties, do not impede the FDI outward or inward, due to the statistically 
results that are different in term of influence direction (contrary sign) and insignificant. In 
other words, the study accepts the hypothesis stating that there is no difference between 
left-wing parties and right-wing parties in defining its FDI policies.  
In the effect of Euro Area countries‘ partisanship on FDI policies, the result does 
not have the same direction of influence with some previous studies, such as research is 
done by Pinto and Pinto (2008). The sign on EAPT (Euro Area Partisanship) is contrary 
from previous researches that tend to show left-wing parties are more favorable to 
protectionism. Left-wing ruling parties in Euro Area apply the same political economy 
with the right-wing ones. Both types of partisanship are favorable to outward FDI. It is 
supported by the fact that during 2000 – 2006, the right-wing parties dominate and 
govern the Euro Area governments. In addition, it is notably recorded that during that 
period, Euro Area countries is obliged to follow the EU‘s FDI common policy (Article 
133 – Treaty of Nice). This policy regulates EU members in its trade policies; one of 
them is about FDI. 
In the relationship between Southeast Asian Partisanship and FDI policies, the 
research indicates that the type of ruling party in Southeast Asian countries does not 
affect its political economy in foreign investment, or in other words, the type of 
partisanship does not influence a country‘s trade policy in Southeast Asian region. 
Specifically, the slope coefficient for the relationship between SAPT and FDI is quite 
strong, positive, and significant. In other words, left-wing ruling parties in Southeast 
Asian governments take free stances as well as the right ones. It is supported by the 
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efforts of ASEAN members, are that, the decision to establish a unified market (AFTA 
and AEC) underscored the desire on the part of the ASEAN leaders to embrace 
comprehensive market integration. AEC seeks to create a regional marketplace in which 
not only goods but also services would flow freely, and in which there would be a freer 
flow of capital and skilled labor. Such an endeavor requires far more effort in terms of 
policy harmonization, and much more willingness to cede ―sovereignty‖, than has ever 
been the case in the past. The attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows is an 
important goal of the AEC; it will also in large part determine the success of ASEAN‘s 
integration efforts. In fact, stimulating FDI inflows by reducing business costs associated 
with multinational activity in the region has always been a primary objective of ASEAN 
economic cooperation. It is something more important than the government 
partisanship‘s interests of ASEAN countries are. 
Other independent variables (control variables), such as GDP, Population, and 
Openness also report the same results with the prior researches. It is interesting to analyze 
the effect of some control variables on FDI that is not the same with the prior researches, 
such as Employment and Unemployment, because it reflects the economic characteristic 
of each region or countries in responding foreign investment. It shows us how those 
characteristics determine the FDI types or the methods of entry in certain market.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
When analyzing the partisanship type of ruling parties that govern in Euro Area and its 
impact on trade policies, it can be concluded that government partisanship does not 
influence its FDI outflows into Southeast Asian countries. In other words, whether left-
wing parties or right ones, both types support FDI outward and there is no any different 
preferences in define its political economy. This provides support for the Magee et. al.‘s 
argument [1989] discussing the powerless politician effect. They said that trade policy 
can largely be ―explained by those exogenous variables that drive the behavior of special 
interests and general interests who favor or oppose protection‖. Special interest groups, 
which are organized into economic sectors, are expected to dominate trade policy, 
rendering parties irrelevant. The results also support the argument that concerns with 
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globalization. Globalization, meaning the integration of national economies into an 
international one, has surged greatly in the past few decades.  It also bears to a 
convergence in the economic policy orientations of many countries. For instance, Boix 
(2000) and Iversen (1999) show that partisan differences over macroeconomic policies 
have declined lately. In general, the proportion of FDI outflows has increased by 0.207 
percent when left-wing parties rules the government. It can be concluded that left parties 
are also favorable to free trade or foreign investment as well as right ones.  
This result restates and revises prior researches of government partisanship and 
any kinds related to it.  It is related to this study‘s contribution in giving more evidences 
about ruling parties‘ behavior. The results reflect leaders‘ intention and ability to manage 
optimally its national economy and explain how they react on constantly changing 
environment, such as economic integration, based on the situation faced. The result 
reveals the condition of Euro Areas political economic, which is matured, and gives 
insights how to optimize it for the sake of economic development strategic decision and 
good government governance. At the same time, the result encourages foreign investors 
to enter and use their presence as multinational companies or transnational companies in 
boosting the application of good corporate governance, that in the next stage, it will 
improve country‘s economic development. 
The results for the effect of Southeast Asian countries‘ partisanship on FDI 
policies indicate that the partisanship type of Southeast Asian governments does not 
influence its preferences in trade policies, especially which are related to foreign 
investment. Like the effect of partisanship in Euro Area, left-wing ruling parties in 
Southeast Asian region prefer to be more favorable to free trade or inward FDI that 
comes from European Union. In other words, both types of partisanship take more on 
free-trade stances. The results also indicate a similar political economy in certain region 
(e.g. Euro Area and Southeast Asian), especially in the emerging region like Southeast 
Asian that aspires to take advantage and benefit from globalization where border barriers 
are reduced. For emerging economies, FDI has significant advantages over equity and 
debt capital flows. Foreign firms‘ participation in domestic business encourages the 
transfer of advanced technologies to the host country, and it fosters human capital 
development by providing employee training. It also strengthens corporate institution by 
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exposing host countries to developed economies‘ best business practice and corporate 
governance. Therefore, it can be believed that Southeast Asian governments‘ preference 
on political economic and FDI are becoming more symmetric over time (and the 
literature has shown that this is also true with respect to macroeconomic variables; the 
business cycles in the original ASEAN countries are becoming increasingly correlated). It 
does not matter what kind of party will take a rule, the government will always be more 
favorable to free trade or inward FDI. It can also explain the ability of government to 
build consensus among competing political factions into a converging party positions in 
political economy; a grand consensus to put economic growth by FDI is above of 
partisanship interests. 
Contribution to the Literature 
The results provide new evidences on the relationship between partisanship and trade 
policies of Euro Area and Southeast Asian countries in terms of political economic 
analysis. This research contributes to the literature in at least three important areas. First 
and most important, it is able to contribute to the literature of determining effective 
political economic decision, especially on regarding the foreign investment debate. By 
arguing for a link between the government partisanship and trade policies and through 
empirical support, this research adds to an understanding of cross-sectional, cross-
regions, and possibly time-series, variation in FDI flows (outward and inward). The 
practical import is that partisanship is less related to the trade policies of a country and 
hence decisions regarding the issue of trade policies need to consider a range of 
implications. These results may also help further explain the link between the 
determinants of FDI allocations. However, further developments on this link are left for 
future research. Second, the study contributes to the literature on political economic 
governance fields by examining the influence of partisan difference on economic policy 
in two different regions that have also different characteristics, such as developed versus 
developing countries, integrated economy versus less integrated economy, and well-
established institutionalization versus less-established institutionalization. Therefore, it 
can provide the basis for a more accurate comparative explanation. Third, the study 
contributes to the literature of foreign investment debate in term of specific event and 
region by using data that covers 11 Euro Area countries and five East Asian countries 
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during the period from the 2000 – 2006 to examine those countries‘ partisanship and its 
FDI policies. Prior researches in this field generally have relied upon the period of pre-
year 2000. 
Implications for Real Life 
The study findings reveal globalization is having important domestic effects, moving all 
parties toward more free trade positions. The steady decline in the extent of debate over 
trade policy suggests the power of globalization domestically. Globalization can be 
expected to induce a shift from market-seeking FDI to efficiency-seeking FDI. 
International competitiveness of local production by foreign investors will then turn out 
to be a decisive factor shaping the distribution of future FDI. This involves major 
challenges for policymakers in developing countries. 
If there is one lesson to be learnt from this study, it is that TNCs (transnational 
companies) tend to take FDI regimes that are more liberal for granted, and consider the 
convergence of FDI regimes to be the natural consequence of globalization. As a result, 
the liberalization of FDI regulations may be characterized by diminishing returns. 
Developing countries not taking part in the general move towards liberalization are likely 
to suffer negative effects of restrictive policies on FDI inflows. When competing for FDI, 
policymakers have to be aware that various measures intended to induce FDI are 
necessary but far from sufficient to do the trick. For example, this applies to the lib-
eralization of FDI regulations and various business facilitation measures. Other reforms, 
such as privatization, tend to be more effective in stimulating FDI inflows, but need to be 
complemented by reform in further areas (e.g. competition policy), in order to ensure that 
FDI inflows are beneficial. Still other determinants of FDI, which were sufficient in the 
past, may prove to be less relevant in the future. The size of local markets (population) 
appears to be the most important case in point. 
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